Methods of prescriptive decision analysis involve both formal methods and judgmental capacities of the (human) decision maker. As a consequence, these methods must meet two kinds of conditions for soundness, one related to formal adequacy, the other to the correspondence of models and methods with actual human capacities. This means that although such methods give rise to preference orderings that are in a deep sense "artificial", especially when aggregated utilities are involved, guidelines are still needed to establish what is reasonable. The purpose of this work is to lay out such guidelines and illustrate some of their implications. This provides a more adequate rationale for prescriptive techniques, in terms of mappings from model elements to human judgments rather than in terms of descriptive adequacy. In so doing, we reinterpret prescriptive decision procedures as a kind of "human artificial intelligence", which helps clarify the nature of constructivism in this case. Here, we must often use 'mechanical' procedures to construct an artificial preference ordering, e.g. MAUT, outranking, AHP. In most cases, the preferences are no longer immediately obvious.
¡

minutes
Preference for home heating 
¡ (oil & 60 min)
Here, we must often use 'mechanical' procedures to construct an artificial preference ordering, e.g. MAUT, outranking, AHP. In most cases, the preferences are no longer immediately obvious.
Note:
¢ £ "construction of preferences" in psychology. The latter is imprecise and the concept is overloaded. It refers to: ¤ context effects (e.g. preference reversal effect) ¤ dependence on experience "In selecting a house, I prefer a shorter drive to work." This depends on learning and prior knowledge, but given these the preference seems intuitively immediate.
Moreover, learning of preferences has never been in dispute (cf. Luce & Suppes, 1965, p. 255-6) .
Point 2
An enlarged conception of soundness is required
Point 3 Substantive interpretation of utility required
An order-preserving-function concept of utility (i.e. a purely descriptive interpretation) is not enough.
Point 4
Work confirms necessity of distinguishing the prescriptive from the normative stance 3 Key Idea ¥ Artificial orderings generated using MCDA techniques always require human judgments.
¥
Hence, some of the criteria for soundness/acceptance should depend on the psychological properties of such judgments.
Addendum
This is NOT the same as descriptive adequacy Criteria must be formal in nature.
4 Soundness-in-Use Criteria 
Criter. 1: Hypothetical Example
Direct ratio judgments (used in SMART and AHP).
Birnbaum and others have produced compelling evidence that such judgments are based on subtractive processes.
Suppose the 'discriminal process' underlying judgments has the intensities given in the table below. The numbers in the "ratio" and "difference" rows represent relative magnitude estimates assuming if these are based on ratios or differences in the underlying intensities. Here we assume that the basic reference-value is 10, but that other intermediate references are used for some judgments. 
Input Intensities and Judgments
But given the actual ratios, the preference would be the reverse (13 
Interpretations of Utility
